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NOTES
The Development of Japanese
Telecommunications Policy and Its
Impact on United States Trade: The
Movement Toward Market
Liberalization
Information is power, and economic information is economic
power. Information has an economic value and the ability to store
and process certain types of data may well give one country political
and technological advantage over other countries This in turn may




The Japanese approach information technology as the keystone
of economic progress. 2 They perceive an information-intensive soci-
ety of the 21st century propelled primarily by advances in telecommu-
nications3 and the integration of telecommunications with computers.
Natural resource limitations and the negative externalities of heavy
industry are largely responsible for Japan's rapid development into a
world leader in communications technology. Like many developed
economies, Japan's telecommunications policy focuses on dominance
1. Louis Joinet, French Magistrate of Justice, Statement before the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Symposium on Transborder Data Flows and the
Protection of Privacy, Vienna, Austria (Sept. 1977) quoted in Eger, Emerging Restrictions on
Transnational Data Fows Privacy Protection or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers?, 10 L. & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 1055, 1065 (1978).
2. Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.30
(1980).
3. Simple definitions of terms for the nontechnical reader will be provided throughout
this Comment. Telecommunications is the transmission of signals of any kind by wire, radio,
optical or other electromagnetic systems. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTER-
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION POLICY: SELECTED IsSUES FOR THE
1980's, S. REP. No. 94, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 53 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED ISSUES
REPORT].
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by the United States of the supply and use of information resources. 4
In world markets the United States maintains a substantial lead in
computer and communications technology. 5 To curb the adverse ef-
fects of U.S. dominance, industrialized nations in Europe and the Far
East have adopted regulations and procedures restricting information
trade with foreign business.6 These nations are attempting to estab-
lish their own indigenous computer and communications industries
and perceive United States competition as an impediment to such de-
velopment.7 Additionally, restrictions have been placed on trans-
border data flows.8 Countries experience a loss of domestic revenue
every time information is transmitted by, processed, and stored in for-
eign telecommunications and computer systems.9
A variety of non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) 0 protect Japan's
computer and communications industries. These barriers decrease
United States business' access to Japan's telecommunications market
specifically through restrictive procurement practices, discriminatory
technical standards, and the denial or limited use of privately leased
lines." Spurred by the divestiture of American Telephone & Tele-
graph (AT&T), Japan has enjoyed relatively unfettered access to the
United States telecommunications market without reciprocal open-
ness for U.S. firms in Japan. The complaint from the United States
government and private sector has been that Japan is engaged in eco-
4. Fishman, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Bortnick, International Data Flow Issues, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, MAJOR ISSuES SYSTEM, Issue brief No. IB81040, 3 (1979) updated
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Data Flow Issues].
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Transborder data flows are, generally, the flow of electronic information across na-
tional borders. Fishman, supra note 2, at 1.
9. Data Flow Issues, supra note 5, at 3.
10. Non-tariff trade barriers are virtually any measure, exclusive of tariffs, which distorts
trade by causing internationally traded goods and services to be allocated so as to reduce
potential real world income. Potential real world income is that level attainable if resources
and outputs are allocated in an economically efficient manner. NTBs include such measures as
import quotas, export subsidies and taxes, discriminatory government and private procure-
ment practices, domestic subsidies, complex customs procedures, anti-dumping regulations,
restrictive administrative, technical, or safety standards, restrictive business practices, foreign
investment controls, selective monetary controls and discriminatory exchange-rate policies. R.
BALDWIN, NONTAREFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5-12 (1970).
11. Spero, Barriers to International Information Flows, TELECOMMUNICATIONS Nov.
1983, at 68. See also, United States-Japan Economic Relations, Hearings Before a Subcomm.
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-212 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Economic
Relations Hearings].
[Vol. 8:95
1985] Japanese Telecommunications 97
nomic protectionism.1 2 Protectionist barriers restrict competition and
hamper trade.13 They pose a very definite threat to American busi-
ness by curtailing its access to the world's second largest telecommu-
nications market. Moreover, they inhibit the free flow of worldwide
information and, in the long run, stifle innovation by limiting the free
exchange of technologies. 14 Continued obstacles to telecommunica-
tions trade are, in turn, detrimental to the United States economy be-
cause they perpetuate an increasingly weighty United States trade
imbalance with Japan.' 5
12. See R. Samuelson, Tokyo's Huge Trade Problem, NEWSWEEK, March 11, 1985 at 66.
13. Generally, on a domestic level, protectionist barriers harm consumers through higher
prices resulting from decreased competition. Internationally, protectionism threatens world
trade by inviting merchandise imitation and retaliation by nations faced with trade barriers.
Id. Unrestricted trade between the United States and Japan would benefit both countries by
stimulating competition, expanding product choices, adding to available capital and technol-
ogy and enhancing economic efficiency. It is also recognized that trade-distorting measures
should be evaluated in terms of world income rather than the income level of a particular
nation. Individual countries can raise their own own income levels using non-tariff measures
just as they do by import duties and other tariffs. However, if each country only considered its
own trade interests, most countries would eventually end up poorer and world income as a
whole would decline. R. BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 7.
14. Protectionist measures slow technological advance and are a drag on the global econ-
omy. Indirectly, they can foster policies and conditions that diminish output. This is caused
by the protection from competition tending to breed monopolistic, market-sharing arrange-
ments among producers and restrictive, inefficient policies among workers. In turn, this
reduces market pressure to seek new and improved products and more efficient managerial
techniques as well as pressure on workers to acquire higher levels of skill. The total effect of
these repercussions can significantly impede worldwide economic welfare. R. BALDWIN, supra
note 10, at 7. Trade barriers also inhibit joint participation in research and development and
the sharing of technological innovation and ideas.
15. The United States trade deficit-the excess of total mer.handise imports over mer-
chandise exports-with Japan has increased dramatically in the past decade from $1.86 billion
in 1975 to $36.8 billion in 1984. L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, pt. I at 1, col. 5. Concern over this
negative balance of payments lies in the effects it has on the United States economy. The most
direct effect of a large trade deficit is the restraining influence it exerts on domestic economic
growth. If the needs of United States businesses and consumers are being met by foreign
suppliers rather than by domestic production, total income and employment in the United
States declines. Similarly, if foreign demand is satisfied by foreign production rather than by
United States exports, income and employment in the United States also suffer. Of course,
imports of commodities that cannot be produced efficiently in the United States (e.g. oil) are
necessary for the continued functioning of the economy, but when imports are not counterbal-
anced by exports the net result is a reduction in the flow of income within the United States
economy. For a complete discussion of the factors affecting the trade balance and its economic
effects see UNITED STATES CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND
THE U.S. ECONOMY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 1978 AND EARLY 1979 (1979).
Other economists claim, however, the focus by the United States on the trade imbalance
with Japan is an unrealistic measure of a nation's overall economic performance. It is con-
tended that the structural differences between the United States and Japanese economies are an
important source of the imbalance, and that a better measure of a nation's economic perform-
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The focus of this Comment will be on Japan's movement toward
the promotion of free competition in its domestic telecommunications
market. As background, a discussion of Japan's industrial policy and
the basic structural differences between the United States and Japa-
nese telecommunications industries is necessary. Specific emphasis is
placed on the types of barriers encountered by United States business
trying to enter the Japanese market, the effects of these barriers, and
United States government action to overcome trade limitations. The
bulk of the analysis will concentrate on three major events which the
Japanese claim are designed to liberalize Japan's telecommunications
market by decreasing government monopolization and promoting free
competition: the Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Procurement
Agreement, 16 the Telecommunications Business Law, 17 and the Nip-
pon Telephone & Telegraph Company Bill.' 8 Finally, the present re-
sults of these policy changes will be examined, as well as their
potential effect in increasing involvement by the United States in Ja-
pan's future procurement, implementation, and development of tele-
communications technology.
A. The Information Age
Since World War II, research and development in electronic
communication among countries has led to quantum leaps in technol-
ogy and a sharp reduction in the cost of providing it.' 9 Undersea
cables and communications satellites, obliterate the distance and geo-
graphic barriers that previously separated major trading countries.
ance is that nation's world current account for merchandise, goods, services, and capital. See,
Note, United States-Japan Trade Developments Under the MTN Agreement on Government
Procurement, 5 FoR DH"A INT'L L.J. 139, 148 n.31 (1981). Nevertheless, the goal of deficit
reduction provides impetus for bilateral negotiation:
From an economic point of view, a bilateral merchandise trade deficit should not be
an object of great concern as long as a nation's worldwide current account is in rough
balance. This economic truth, however, is a political falsity.... For millions of
Americans this highly visible deficit erodes their support of open trade; it creates
tensions which threaten to spill over into unrelated sectors of our bilateral
relationship.
Economic Relations Hearings, supra note 11, at 150.
16. Agreement on Procurement in Telecommunications, Dec. 19, 1980, United States-
Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 9961, reprinted in E. Asian Exec. Reps., Jan. 15, 1981, at 24-30 [hereinaf-
ter cited as NTT Agreement].
17. Telecommunications Business Law (Unofficial Translation), 1 Japanese Legislation of
Telecommunications (1984).
18. Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Company Bill, Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushiki
Kaisha Law (1984).
19. Fishman, supra note 2, at 7.
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Optical fibers20 allow us efficient and economical transmission of large
volumes of information at high speed with high quality. The fusion of
computer and telecommunications technologies 21 is the driving force
behind the precipitous development which has thrust us into an "In-
formation Age".
22
Each day we take a step further away from the one-way tele-
phone communications of yesterday; from the limits of audio trans-
mission toward worldwide visual transmission. The 21st century
promises much intrigue as to how these new technologies will effect
our lives. In the sphere of manufacturing, industrial robot networks
will be developed, eventually leading to totally automated factories.
23
Full-capacity offices at home will reduce commuting costs and offer
worker flexibility. The expansion of office automation will make the
paper-less office a reality.24 Through connection of home terminals to
multiple data bases, in-home education, home theaters, home shop-
ping and home banking will soon be possible. 25 Mailmen will vanish
into obsolescence. Critical to this new post-industrial stage of devel-
opment is the ability to put information to use for economic growth
and development.
B. Maintaining the Lead
Today the United States is the world leader in communications
20. Fiber optics is the technology for transmitting light in thin, flexible glass fibers. It can
be used to carry large amounts of information long distances with excellent transmission qual-
ity. SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra note 3, at 46.
21. See generally, Pyykkonen, Computers in Communications, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
Jan., 1985 at 67.
22. The history of man can be charted by four revolutions in communications develop-
ment: (1) the acquisition of language, (2) the creation of written language, (3) the invention of
printing, and (4) the development of telecommunications and broadcasting. The fifth revolu-
tion is an era spawned by the advances in the integration of telecommunications and com-
puters. This era has been deemed the "Information Age," and is characterized by information-
intensive society which benefits from the production, processing, and distribution of informa-
tion. ENGINEERING BUREAU, NIPPON TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH PUBLIC CORP., INFORMA-
TION NETWORK SYSTEM: TOMORROW'S INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY 4 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as INS BOOKLET]. As early as 1977, approximately 46% of the American work force is
comprised of information-related workers, as opposed to persons pursuing trades, en-
trepreneurial ventures, farm or factory work. Today more than half of the United States Gross
National Product is tied to the production of information and technological goods and serv-
ices. See M. PORAT, THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT 121
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications Special Publication 77-12(1) (1977)).
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and computer technology. Data processing26 and transmission serv-
ices developed in the United States have become vital to the daily
functioning of international activities from health services to trans-
portation to finance and credit.27 Information is no longer merely
facts, statistics, academic knowledge, scientific data or daily news; it
now includes such things as remote satellite sensing of natural re-
sources, 28 electronic impulses probing outer space or the depths of the
sea, and numeric digits for electronic transferring of funds to and
from bank accounts. 29 It has become a marketable commodity for
production, sale, and consumption. 30 The marriage of computer and
telecommunication technologies has generated an unprecedented in-
vestment boom in communications equipment and facilities. 31 Bil-
lions of dollars of international trade depend upon the burgeoning
communications industry, and upon government policies that regulate
communications activities.32 With the volume of sales at stake, there
is considerable concern about the trade-restrictive effects of non-tariff
barriers. 33 Since information industries are rapidly becoming a signif-
icant component of a favorable United States balance of payments,
the need to abolish or at least mitigate the effects of these barriers is
imperative. Additionally, American business may not be able to
maintain its competitive edge if precluded from full participation in
the key markets. Absent government subsidies, the cost of research
26. Data processing is the mechanical or electronic handling of data, sorting, collating,
performing mathematical steps, storing, erasing or printing. SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra
note 3, at 45.
27. Eger, supra note 1, at 1060.
28. See generally, Comment, Municipal Law Regulation of Remote Sensing in Outer
Space, 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 93, 93-96 (1984).
29. Eger, supra note 1, at 1061.
30. Id
31. Fishman, supra note 2, at 7.
32. For example, U.S. exports of information-based services are estimated to be in excess
of $30 billion; total U.S. exports of all services being approximately $60 billion in 1982.
Feketekuty & Hauser, A Trade Perspective of International Telecommunications Issues 1 (1984)
(unpublished manuscript). It should be noted that data collection is particularly poor in the
services field, and these figures have been extrapolated from aggregate data available from the
International Monetary Fund and include inter-company exports of information services. The
worldwide market for communications equipment in 1984 was about $60 billion, and sales of
hardward alone are expected to grow to $88.4 billion by 1988. Telecommunications" The
Global Battle, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 24, 1984 at 127. Some sources estimate the combined
computer and telecommunications market for equipment and services will be as much as $500
billion by 1990. Spero, Information" The Policy Void, 48 FOREIGN POLICY 139, 145 (1982).
33. Feketekuty, supra note 32, at 7.
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and development of new technological breakthroughs may well ex-
ceed the benefit derived from sales.
II. BACKGROUND--JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY
In the wake of World War II, Japan was faced with the world's
highest population density, virtually no natural resources, deficient
capital accumulation, and lagging technology. 34 In forty years it has
restructured and grown to become one of the world's leading eco-
nomic and technologically advanced societies. The development of
heavy and chemical industries in the 1960's helped Japan strengthen
its competitiveness in world markets.35 By the mid 1970's the stan-
dard of living in many respects paralleled Western industrialized na-
tions.36 However, serious environmental pollution problems caused a
reevaluation and transformation of the industrial policy. 37 In 1971,
the Industrial Structure Council created the "Vision of MITI Policies
in 1970's" 3 which proposed a shift to a knowledge-intensive indus-
trial structure. 39 Accordingly, the 1970's saw increased growth in
high technology industries such as computers and electronics. Indus-
tries less dependent on research, development, and technical innova-
tion began tapering off.40
The basic philosophy underlying Japan's industrial policy is the
principle of free competition, in the interests of ensuring maximum
efficiency of the market mechanism. 41 Theoretically, problems in
achieving optimal resource allocation from a long-term, dynamic per-
spective cause a relaxation of a pure laissez faire economy and the
need for government intervention. 42 Practically, government regula-
tion is often fashioned to foster the growth of developing industries
until they are able to compete internationally. Regulations also pre-
scribe policy goals for business to promote the general welfare of Jap-
34. THE JAPAN INSTITE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE WHITE PAPERS OF JA-
PAN 1982-1983, ANNUAL ABsTRAcr OF OFFICIAL REPORTS AND STATISTICS OF THE JAPA-
NESE GOVERNMENT 183 (1984) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPERS].
35. Id at 185.
36. Id
37. Id
38. JAPAN MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDuSTRY, THE VISION OF
MITI POLICIES IN THE 1970's (Tokyo 1971).
39. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 34, at 185.
40. Id
41. Id at 184.
42. Id
1985]
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anese society. The telecommunications industry is a paragon of this
structure.
The formal legal structure of business/government relations in
the United States and Japan is similar.43 Policy is formed through a
mixture of formal hearings and informal consultations.44 However,
different political and social attitudes toward business and economic
growth in Japan make informal interaction much more common.
While United States bureaucratic policy-making can be characterized
as adversarial, the Japanese take a more consensual, bipolar ap-
proach.45 The two interests represented, business and government,
usually have complementary long-term goals and the latitude to reach
a compromise maximizing both interests." The Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) seeks to avoid conflict on
short-term interests by maintaining an ongoing interaction between its
bureaus and particular industries.47 Through a policy of constant dia-
logue, MITI's policies and decisions are often amenable to industry,
while serving larger government goals. A key factor in the mutual
understanding between business and bureaucracy is a genuine na-
tional commitment to the goal of economic growth.48 This coopera-
tive relationship between government and business has led to the
controversial phrase "Japan, Inc. ' ' 49 When conflicts to arise, MITI
has statutory authority to enforce its policies against unwilling firms
or industries. MITI is authorized to administer 109 separate laws. 50
These laws enable it to establish institutions, control and develop in-
dustry, regulate prices and market operations, provide quality con-
trol, regulate patents, and participate in environmental protection. 51
43. B. RICHARDSON & T. UEDA, BusINESS AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN, 195 (1981).
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id at 195-96.
47. Id at 196. In addition to formulating industrial policy, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) is responsible for drafting and implementing policies in related
areas such as international trade, energy, and technological development. MITI also plays an
important role in creating basic government policies at the cabinet level, and ensures these
policies comport with industrial policy. MITI is divided into two divisions, the "vertical divi-
sion" and the "horizontal division." Each division is comprised of various subdivisions. Each
vertical division is designed to eliminate obstacles to the development of a specific industry
sector. Horizontal divisions handle common industry issues such as long term business and
economic trends, trade, industrial location, and pollution. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 34, at
189.
48. B. RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 198.
49. Id. at 195.




Current policy goals focus on enhancement of the general public
welfare vis-a-vis maximizing the vitality of private enterprise through
the promotion of information-intensive industries.52 The Japanese
Government plays a key role in the fulfillment of these objectives.
For instance, it assists in the early stages of technological develop-
ment, when the financial or technical resource risks might be too high
for private firms. 53 Although Japan is beginning to promote interna-
tional cooperation in the form of joint venture R & D projects, it still
is subject to accusations of employing an "industrial targeting policy"
by fostering export industries.54 This policy is purportedly designed
to bring about the domination of United States and world markets
through the enaction of trade protection measures and lavish govern-
ment subsidies to promote its high technology industries.55 Japan de-
nies these allegations. It claims that it is merely striving to improve
its economy under an open market system and that subsidies given by
its government are no larger than those of Western countries.
56
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Recent legislative developments in Japan have begun a restruc-
turing of the country's telecommunications industry toward a freer
market system.57 However, recognizing the traditional structural dif-
ferences between the United States and the Japanese telecommunica-
52. WHrrE PAPERS, supra note 34, at 187. The "Vision of MITI policies in the 1980's,"
submitted by the Industrial Structure Council in March 1980, outlines Japan's three general
policy goals for this decade: (1) Making a due contribution to the development of the world
economy, including the maintenance of free trade, the promotion of an international division
of labor, and comprehensive economic cooperation with developing countries; (2) Lessening
Japan's dependence on foreign energy supplies; and (3) Balancing the drive for economic
growth against efforts to improve the quality of life. Id at 185-87.
53. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 34, at 188.
54. Id at 194.
55. Id.
56. Id at 194-95. Japan counters United States criticisms of prodigious government sub-
sidies by claiming that U.S. government subsidies for R & D, exclusive of defense spending,
were four percent higher in 1982 than were Japanese subsidies in 1983. Additionally, Japan
claims that while the United States economy basically operates on a free market system, the
Federal Government plays an important role in financing high technology areas such as tele-
communications, semi-conductors, and computers. "A case in point is the tax incentives of-
fered to United States industry for equipment investment and R & D spending." Id at 193-95.
57. In December, 1984 Japan's Diet passed two pieces of legislation to revitalize and
strengthen the telecommunications industry by allowing it to compete in the private sector.
The Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company Law mandates the privatization of Nippon
Telephone and Telegraph which had historically been a government-owned monopoly. The
Telecommunications Business Law is aimed at securing the participation of the domestic and
foreign private sectors by facilitating a system designed to allow new entries into the field of
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tions industry assists in understanding the problems being confronted
by United States businesses today. Secondly, it provides a founda-
tional yardstick to measure change. Of primary importance is the
role of Japan's national government as the chief policy-making au-
thority, as the largest user of information resources, and as a supplier
of telecommunications facilities.
5 8
The renaissance of Japan's telecommunications business opera-
tions occurred in 1952 with the government reorganization of tele-
communications services.59 Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public
Corporation (NTT) 6° was given exclusive authority to provide domes-
tic communication services, while Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd.
(KDD)61 was deemed the exclusive international carrier. Competi-
tion in communications was nominal to nonexistent because the pro-
vision of domestic service was organizationally separated from
international service. 62 In 1971, data communications obtained legal
recognition with the revision of the Public Telecommunication Law.
63
telecommunications. See infra notes 195-240 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
new legislation.
58. See infra note 60.
59. Gershon & Gawdun, Reform of Japan's Telecommunications Operations, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS Dec. 1984 at 82.
60. The reader of this Comment should note that much of the data reported regarding
NTF's size and function reflects NTTs status prior to its 1985 privatization. While many of
NTIT's functions will continue to remain the same, changes in organizational structure and size
should be anticipated. See infra, notes 199-217 and accompanying text. Before NTTs priva-
tization, NTT was the world's largest telephone company, after the divestiture of AT&T, and
supplied Japan with all its domestic telecommunications services. In addition to providing
telephone service for more than 58 million subscribers, NTT provided telegram, telex, data
communications and processing services through over 2,000 central offices in Japan. Founded
in 1952, NTT had approximately 330,000 employees and annual revenues of over $18 billion in
1984. NTI has had no manufacturing division, and, therefore, purchased close to $3 billion in
telecommunications and related products each year. As a government-owned monopoly, it
was the largest supplier of computer services in the country and set the rules for competing in
the Japanese telecommunications market. In tandem to providing these services in Japan,
NTT still operates four Research & Development laboratories and seven overseas offices. In
its four electrical communication laboratories, NiT is conducting extensive research on digital
telecommunications, optical fiber technology, Large Scale Integrated circuits, satellite commu-
nications, and computer technology of the future. See, High Technology Gateway: Foreigners
Demand a Piece of NTT's $3 Billion Market, Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 1982 at 40. See also NIPPON
TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE PUBLIC CORPORATION, 1982/1983 ANNUAL REPORT (1983).
61. KDD is a private corporation. The Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions (MPT) oversees both KDD and NTT.
62. Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transborder Flow of
Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287, 294 (1981).
63. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 3 Policy Impi-
cations of Data Network Developments in the OECD Area 44 (Paris 1980). Data communica-
tions now represented a new type of telecommunications which made it possible, in the course
Japanese Telecommunications
The revision gave NTT and KDD the authority to handle on-line
data processing as a form of telecommunication services.64 The tele-
communications system was based on a policy of assuring NTT's con-
tinued monopolization of the public telecommunications business.
NTT's exclusive authority precluded foreign competition from sup-
plying Japan's domestic communications needs because NTT
purchased its goods and services solely from Japanese companies.
This monopolistic structure made it possible for the rapid post-war
recovery, and enabled the country to develop universal service.65 As a
powerful branch of the government, NTT could implement policies
and goals that limited or conflicted with the provision of economical
and efficient telecommunications services. 66 It is still free to structure
technical standards, tariffs, and non-tariff regulations to achieve the
government's economic and political goals. This is done for the pur-
pose of inhibiting the access of foreign competition to the Japanese
market and the free flow of information across national borders. 67
In contrast, the United States private sector has historically
served the telecommunications and related equipment needs of con-
sumers.68 Before its divestiture, American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T) had a virtual private monopoly on the U.S. telecommunica-
tions market, with the Bell companies captive customers to Western
Electric. The break-up of AT&T enabled the Bell companies to buy
on a worldwide basis and broke the United States market wide open
to other countries. The effect was like that of a unilateral trade con-
cession.69 Today, telecommunications services and products required
by U.S. industry are provided by hundreds of regulated and unregu-
lated organizations. 70 Authority to regulate is divided among several
government agencies. The major participants in formulating interna-
tional telecommunications and information policy are the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration of the Department of Com-
merce (NTIA), the Department of State, and the United States Trade
of transmission, to change the -,ontents of data for a specific purpose, using telecommunica-
tions facilities to store, add to, and retrieve data. Id
64. Id.
65. Gershon & Gawdun, supra note 59, at 82.
66. Markoski, supra note 62, at 295.
67. Id
68. Id at 289.
69. Telecommunications Trade Act of 1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984).
70. Markoski, supra note 62, at 289.
1985]
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Representative (USTR).71
The FCC is responsible for regulating all interstate and foreign
communication by means of radio, television, wire, cable, and satel-
lite.72 Part of its duty is to regulate common carriers in interstate and
foreign communications. 73 In addition to these responsibilities, the
FCC participates in a consultative capacity with foreign telecommuni-
cations authorities. 74 Thus, while NTT, as a government owned mo-
nopoly, could adopt policies in furtherance of its own business needs
or the goals of its government, the FCC has no such authority. 75 The
NTIA has been delegated broader authority in domestic and interna-
tional telecommunications policymaking and operations.76 It serves
as the principle advisory and policymaking authority in the telecom-
munications area.77 In the Department of State, the Secretary of State
provides the more generalized function of advising the President on
71. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 98TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., LONG-RANGE GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO RMA-
TIoN-AN OUTLINE FOR UNITED STATES POLICY 70 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited
as LONG RANGE GOALS].
72. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934 as an independent regula-
tory agency responsible directly to Congress. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq. The FCC is not part of the Executive Branch nor is it necessarily bound to Administra-
tion policies. It was created:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio commu-
nication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the
National defense... promoting safety of life and... securing a more effective execu-
tion of this policy by centralizing authority....
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
73. LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 71, at 73-74. The FCC fulfills its international
telecommunications responsibilities by approving construction and operation of communica-
tions facilities, service offerings, and the tariffs or rates charged. It does this by allocating and
assigning radio frequencies to non-Federal government users and by participating in interna-
tional negotiations and conferences. The agency also establishes rules and regulations for in-
ternational telecommunications and influences United States policy and reactions of foreign
entities through speeches and statements of the Chairman and Commissioners. Id at 74.
74. Markoski, supra note 62, at 293.
75. Id at 295.
76. LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 71, at 70. NTIA was formed in 1978 as successor
to both the Executive Office of Telecommunications Policy and the Office of Telecommunica-
tions in the Commerce Department. See, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1977 comp.); 3 C.F.R. 158 (1978
comp.).
77. Among NTIA's significant international policymaking responsibilities are to:
(1) serve as the President's principal advisor on telecommunications policies; (2) develop plans,
policies, and programs which relate to international telecommunications issues, conferences,
and negotiations, and coordinate participation in such conferences and negotiations; (3) pro-
vide for the coordination of the telecommunications activities of the Executive Branch; (4) de-
velop telecommunications policies pertaining to the Nation's economic and technological
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the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of United States
foreign relations. 78 International telecommunications is treated as a
minor subset of this function.79 Additionally, the Department of
State heads or names the heads of United States delegations to inter-
national telecommunications conferences and negotiations.80 The
United States Trade Representative, a Cabinet-level official with the
rank of Ambassador, is responsible "for developing, and for coordi-
nating the implementation of, United States international trade pol-
icy .... ,,81 He serves "as the principle advisor to the President on
international trade policy and [advises] the President on the impact of
other policies of the United States Government on international
trade .... ,,"2 The USTR also has the "lead responsibility for the
conduct of international trade negotiations. 8 3
Instead of providing a clear demarcation in international tele-
communications policymaking authority, Congressional and Execu-
tive authorizations create ambiguities in areas of overlap.8 4 This has
led to a characterization of the United States government as "frag-
mented" and "ineffective" in dealing with these issues.8 5 For exam-
ple, the FCC, as an agency independent of Executive Branch control,
may effectively establish international policy on its own which may
advance or thwart Administration policies.8 6
advancement; and (5) ensure the Executive Branch views on telecommunications matters are
presented to the FCC and Congress. See, Exec. Order No. 12046, 3 C.F.R. 158 (1978 comp.).
78. LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 71, at 72.
79. Id. Executive Order 12046 of 1978 grants the Secretary of State "primary authority
for the conduct of foreign policy, including the determination of United States positions and
the conduct of the United States participation in negotiations with foreign governments and
international bodies." The Order also authorizes the Secretary to oversee the Communications
Satellite Corporation. Exec. Order No. 12046, §§ 5-201, 5-202, 3 C.F.R. 158, 164 (1978).
80. LONG RANGE GoALs, supra note 71, at 72-73.
81. Id at 74-75.
82. Id at 75.
83. Id
84. Id at 71.
85. Private industry complains of "fragmented, ambiguous grants of authority, and con-
sequent problems of lack of coordination, myopia, and lack of accountability." Id at 81.
86. Id. As international telecommunications grows, the significance of FCC policy deci-
sions increases, not only in the area of telecommunications, but also in its impact on national
security, trade, and foreign policy. Id at 82. The General Accounting Office (GAO) stated
that FCC authority has transcended its traditional areas of expertise to consider foreign affairs,
national security, and foreign policy. As an example of this the GAO cites proceedings in
which the FCC reviewed AT&T's proposed award of a contract for fiber optic cable to West-
era Electric instead of to a lower bidding Japanese company. Although the foreign policy and
trade issues were discussed with the Department of State, Commerce, and USTR, the final
decision rested with the FCC. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFcE, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICA-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J[
The monopolistic structure of the Japanese system, when com-
bined with the dissimilar and fragmented role of United States gov-
ernment, has left United States business in a weak bargaining
position. During the 1970's there existed no coherent policy to assist
businesses in overcoming trade barriers or to mitigate the potential
financial losses.8 7 Companies faced with the arbitrary or discrimina-
tory government actions have had few, if any, remedies.88 Federal
agencies were slow in responding to specific problems brought to their
attention, and often address them on a haphazard, ad hoc, basis or
sometimes completely ignored them.8 9 As a result, United States en-
terprise was either precluded from investing in the Japanese market
altogether, restricted from investing certain types of technologies, or
inhibited from utilizing its overseas facilities in conjunction with ex-
penditures in Japan. The 1980's have brought about a heightened
awareness of these trade restrictive policies. Governmental agencies
have actively pursued bilateral negotiations with Japan in an effort to
liberalize trade and increase access to the Japanese telecommunica-
tions market.9° Concurrent Congressional attention has begun to as-
sist U.S. business in developing a more aggressive stance toward these
barriers and helped to define the Government's role in this trade
conflict.9 1
IV. JAPANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS
Telecommunications trade and investment barriers can be di-
vided into three broad categories. 92 The first category consists of bar-
riers arising out of traditional regulatory schemes in a new
technological setting.93 In Japan, technological advances pose a di-
lemma between the preservation of NTT as the government's commu-
TIONS COMMISSION'S INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AcrIvrrIEs, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
3 (Apr. 19, 1982). Since there is no statute mandating the FCC's deference to Executive
Branch views, the FCC is obliged to balance the diversity of considerations on an ad hoc basis.
LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 71, at 83.
87. Feketekuty & Aronson, Meeting the Challenges of the World Information Economy, 7
THE WORLD ECONOMY 63, 69 (1984).
88. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK].
89. Id
90. See infra notes 132-194 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 241-252 and accompanying text.




nications monopoly and the pressure for greater economic efficiency
and more open competition. Traditional regulatory objectives are
threatened by the increased freedom to experiment with new applica-
tions of technology.94 The United States' more rapid adoption of pro-
competitive policies has resulted in a clash of expectations between
United States firms and foreign telecommunications administra-
tions.95 Second, barriers arise from socio-political concerns about the
impact of new technology. 96 Such concerns include privacy, cultural
integrity, and national security. Finally, countries use telecommuni-
cations regulations to promote infant industries and limit foreign
competition in information-intensive sectors. 97 While the list of spe-
cific types of non-tariff barriers is long,98 Japan's most egregious trade
obstacles take two general forms: (1) limitations on the use of leased
lines and, (2) restrictive procurement practices.
A. Private Leased Line Restrictions
The leased line issue involves communication lines leased by sup-
pliers of data-processing or data-based services. Generally, Japan's
private-line policy has been far more stringent than that of the United
States. A variety of restrictions limit resale and shared use of private
lines,99 as well as interconnection between private lines and the public
switched network. 1i ° Restrictions create significant problems for
firms providing data processing and other information-based services
in Japan. In the past, Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions (MPT), through the international telecommunications author-




97. Id at 169-70.
98. In telecommunications and information trade, NTB's may take the form of (1) re-
strictive government procurement policies; (2) restrictions on the use of leased lines; (3) dis-
criminatory technical standards for data communication services; (4) unreasonably high rates
for international services; (5) restrictions on the use of foreign data processing facilities; (6) na-
tional security restrictions; (7) national assertions of data ownership; or (8) privacy laws. Id
at 170-71. This list is not exhaustive.
99. Private line service is a telecommunications service used by high volume or special
needs customers which offers a link between specific points solely for that customer's private
use during specific time periods. SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra note 3, at 51. So, firms
leasing communications lines to transmit data may be prohibited from reselling or sharing the
use of their lines in an effort to reduce their costs.
100. LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 71, at 170. In Japan, the interconnection between
public and private networks is referred to as the Interconnect Market.
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local computer centers before transmission was permitted over leased
lines. Such discrimination against foreign data processing companies
protected local industry, and prevented the undermining of NTT's
monopoly control while assuring it higher revenues.' 0 A case in
point is the Control Data controversy.
Control Data, a United States corporation, is a world supplier of
data processing systems, equipment, and services. Its data processing
services include general timesharing,l°2 remote access and data based
management systems.10 3 These services use telecommunications as
the transportation medium between Control Data's computer centers
in the U.S. and facilities located throughout the world on its custom-
ers' premises. In 1976, after two years of delay by the Japanese, Con-
trol Data entered into a contract with Japan's international carrier,
KDD.104 The contract was to provide for private leased line service
to transmit data between Japan and the United States at a flat
monthly rate, subject to some restrictions. However, one of the re-
strictions was a limitation on the transfer of data between Control
Data's processing center in the U.S. This limitation was based on a
definitional matter. KDD viewed this data transfer as "message-
switching," which was prohibited by Japanese law. 0 5 Data transfer
did not, however, constitute message-switching under United States
law or the applicable international convention.10 6
101. Feketekuty & Hauser, supra note 32, at 13.
102. Timesharing is a non-profit arrangement where several users collectively subscribe to
a private line service of an established carrier and in turn share the costs of obtaining services.
SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra note 3, at 52.
103. International Data Flow, Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Government Information
and Individual Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Data Flow Hearings] (statement of Philip C. Onstad, Manager of
Telecommunications Policy, Control Data Corp.) [hereinafter cited as Onstad Statement].
104. Onstad Statement supra note 103, at 47. At that time, all Control Data's telecommu-
nications services ran between its computer centers in the United States and Europe to the
hundreds of customer terminals around the world. Id. at 35. Since exclusive authority for
international telecommunications was vested in KDD, it had to approve all aspects of a facility
or service prior to institution of any service. Successful completion of approval negotiations
was prerequisite to the provision of telecommunications services. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 48.
106. The International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCITT is the
appropriate international convention. As a branch of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), CCITT is responsible for drawing up texts concerning public correspondence
services for the ITU. The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations, which plays a
key role in establishing the technological infrastructure that permits transborder data flow. It
adopts protocols, formats prescriptions for data networks and regulations for international
leased lines for data transmission. ITU Administrative Regulations, which may be both tech-
nical and operational, when drawn by Administrative Conferences have treaty force between
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By reducing the number of computer bases in the United States
from which Control Data could draw, the company was severely lim-
ited in the services it could offer in Japan. It was also precluded from
providing a full range of backup and security functions for the serv-
ices it did offer. This significantly curtailed Control Data's ability to
compete in the Japanese market. 107 Subsequently, Control Data
sought alternative avenues of recourse to remedy the situation. 108
Discussions with KDD and a host of international and United States
Government trade and commerce agencies proved futile. After years
of getting no significant results from its actions, Control Data decided
to bear the additional expense of establishing separate processing fa-
cilities in Japan; a development which had the pendant affect of de-
creasing a United States exports of data services to Japan.
Similar restrictions were encountered by Tymshare Inc., a lead-
ing firm in remote access computer services throughout the United
States, Canada, and overseas. In 1976, Tymshare and its Japanese
affiliate were initially encouraged by the Japanese Government's swift
approval of both the formation of a joint venture in Japan and permis-
sion to transfer adequate funds to finance the business.1 09 However,
within a few months prior to startup, after staff had been hired, office
space rented, and financial commitments made, KDD refused to ap-
prove the dedicated transpacific telephone line which Tymshare had
ordered from them.' 10 The communication link was vital since the
basic computer service was to be provided from United States based
computers to Japan via the transpacific line. During the ensuing six-
teen months, KDD delayed by conducting extremely detailed inspec-
tions of Tymshare's equipment centers and proprietary software, and
demanded special modifications of standard computer services." 1
When KDD finally approved the telephone line it was under highly
restrictive conditions seemingly intended to provide the "maximum
conflict and inconvenience possible." 2 Facing the alternative of
member nations. See Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: Progress Re-
port, 9 U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Agenda Item 9(b)1, 15 U.N. Doc.
E/C. 10/12 (1983).
107. Onstad Statement, supra note 103, at 48-49.
108. Id. at 50-53.
109. Data Flow Hearings, supra note 103, at 72 (Statement of Mr. Warren E. Burton, Vice
President, Government Affairs, Tymshare Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Burton Statement].
110. Id. at 73.
111. Id at 73-74.
112. Id at 74. One condition imposed was that the requested circuit be connected only to
certain specified computer systems at one specific computer center in the United States. Addi-
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complete exclusion from the Japanese market, Tymshare acceded to
KDD's demands. As in the Control Data situation, these restrictions
significantly reduced Tymshare's competitiveness. 13
During the sixteen month waiting period Tymshare worked ex-
tensively with the Department of State, Department of Commerce
(including the Trade Facilitation Committee and the NTIA), FCC,
USTR, and the Executive Office of the President.11 4 The firm con-
cluded that these agenices were generally reluctant to get involved
and refused to acknowledge responsibility or authority to provide
assistance in these matters.11 5 Finally, nearly four years after Tym-
share's initial request for services, Japan's Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications authorized KDD to negotiate removal of the
restrictions. This permitted the company access to multiple computer
processing centers in the United States via international telecommuni-
cation access lines leased from KDD.11 6 The Control Data and Tym-
share cases raise the issue of the extent to which private companies
are allowed to compete in a monopolistic communications market. 1 7
Although flagrant trade barriers such as these have been reduced, Ja-
pan's telecommunications procurement practices continue to exclude
United States firms from competing freely.
tionally, Tymshare could not connect to any public network in the United States, including
Tymnet Inc., its affiliate. Id. at 74-75.
113. Markoski, supra note 62, at 312.
114. Data Flow Hearings, supra note 103, at 75. The State Department, the leading repre-
sentative of economic and legal policy positions abroad, had few people who could handle
these information trade issues. Those who were responsible in these areas had to oversee a
wide range of information policy matters. Spero, supra note 32, at 151. The Trade Act of
1979 requires the Office of the USTR to follow an extensive administration process, culminat-
ing in a review by the President, if a party files a formal complaint with respect to foreign trade
restrictions. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2414 (West 1980). Markoski, supra note 62, at 313 and 316
n. 144. Some claim that the USTR's resources are inadequate to appropriately deal with com-
munications trade issues within its mandate. Spero, supra note 32, at 151. The Joint United
States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee was established in September 1977 to encourage
increased Japanese imports through cooperation in trade development activities and in the
resolution of market access problems. See 43 Fed. Reg. 23,628 (1978); Markoski, supra note
62, at 313 n.129.
115. Burton Statement, supra note 109, at 76. The reluctance of government agencies to
address these problems stemmed largely from the ambiguities in the delegation of policy-mak-
ing authority for international telecommunications. SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra note 3,
at 18. Another reason had been the inability of businesses to recognize the problems because
of poor communication between the technical managers and senior corporate policy makers.
Spero, supra note 11, at 67.
116. Markoski, supra note 62, at 317.
117. Feketekuty & Aronson, supra note 87, at 73.
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B. Hardware and Software Procurement
Japan's procurement policies constitute the most serious trade
barriers to the foreign telecommunications industry. These policies
also provide protection for data-processing and other domestic infor-
mation industries. As a government owned monopoly, NTT was
under little competitive pressure to buy cost effective equipment.
Consequently, in the interest of assisting Japanese industry, NTT sat-
isfied the nation's equipment needs by contracting work out to special
domestic producers. 1 18 In the typical Japanese tradition, most of
NTT's business was distributed among 200 to 300 companies. 119
About 50% of total sales went to only four firms: NEC Corporation,
Fujitsu Limited, Oki Electric, and Hitachi. These four, together with
about 17 medium-sized companies, controlled about 80% of the do-
mestic Japanese telecommunications equipment production. (This
collection of companies is referred to as the "Denden Family"). The
close relationship between NTT and its suppliers stems, in part, from
their long working alliance and practice of cooperating on joint re-
search and development projects. Additionally, many of these "fam-
ily" company directors are former NTT executives who act in
advisory positions after retiring from NTT. 120 Japan's restrictive pro-
curement practices have distorted international trade in telecommuni-
cations equipment and precluded United States producers from
tapping Japan's market.' 21 Evidence of this lies in the radical trade
imbalance between the United States and Japan in 1984. For exam-
ple, in 1984, Japan shipped $2.1 billion of telecommunications prod-
ucts to the U.S. (an increase of 49% from 1983), while the United
States sold just $193 million worth to Japan. 122 Even after NTT's
privatization, it is still responsible for developing and maintaining
close relationships with major national manufacturers of electronic
and telecommunications equipment.123 However, since NTT now ac-
counts for a minority (about 40%) of Japan's telecommunications
purchases, it is beginning to play a smaller role in procurement, leav-
118. Harada, Changes in the Japanese Telecommunications Industry and the Opportunities
Created for Foreign Firms in Japan, Conference Paper, Pacific Telecom Council 7th Annual
Conference, Jan. 13-16, 1985, at 110 [hereinafter cited as PTC Conf. Paper].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. LONG RANGE GoALs, supra note 71, at 159-60.
122. Facing Off With Japan, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985 at 8.
123. Feketekuty & Aronson, supra note 87, at 69.
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ing more room for foreign competitors. 124
Discriminatory product application, testing, and importation
standards and procedures, which favor national business, pose signifi-
cant barriers to foreign equipment suppliers.1 25 Discriminatory stan-
dards may take the form of bid qualifications specifying a particular
technology used by a favored supplier (and merely going through the
motions of the bidding process). The MPT may simply refuse to ac-
cept products tested abroad or require time consuming and expensive
testing and inspection within Japan. 126 In the telecommunications
field, the Japanese are excellent at implementing non-transparent
standards and subjecting foreign suppliers to a maze of approving au-
thorities. United States firms are also excluded by not being informed
of opportunities which exist in the Japanese market, or of the appro-
priate application or bidding procedures. While the recent wave of
legislation has begun to wipe out the effects of these protectionist
measures, United States companies are still said to face a "cumber-
some and inherently discriminatory system."'
27
Part of the problem is that the United States suffers from a lack
of bargaining power in negotiating for a reduction of barriers; i.e.
trade restrictions in the United States that can be exchanged for re-
duced barriers in Japan. 128 Most United States trade barriers exist in
declining, not growing, industries. In telecommunications the United
States was the first nation to replace the government-regulated mo-
nopoly with a more competitive structure. Through the divestiture of
AT&T, the United States has opened up its markets to a world of
competition. On a national level we have retained little negotiating
leverage. Since the American market remains open, there is no incen-
tive for Japan, or other countries, to open theirs; except in the name of
freer trade. Until recently, the U.S. government has not perceived a
124. Telecommunications Trade, Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Trade of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1984) (statement of Lionel Olmer,
Under Secretary of International Trade, Department of Commerce).
125. LONG RANGE GoALS, supra note 71, at 159.
126. Feketekuty & Aronson, supra note 87, at 70. Telecommunications services can also
be priced to discriminate against foreign users. An example of discriminatory pricing can be
seen in the Tyrnshare case. If Tymshare had subscribed to a new KDD communications ser-
vice-instead of using present fixed cost, dedicated telephone line-they would have been per-
mitted to offer and sell their full range of services in Japan. Tymshare estimated the costs of
this to be about 10 times greater than the fixed cost, dedicated telephone lines. FORGING A
NEw FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, at 13.
127. L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1 (Statement of Commerce Under Secretary
Lionel Olmer appearing before the Senate Finance subcommittee on International Trade).
128. LONG RANGE GoALS, supra note 71, at 160.
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need to intervene to promote America's telecommunications or com-
puter industries. 29 As a result the Japanese have taken advantage by
entering the United States market without a reciprocal opening of
their own market. 130 It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts by
the United States to bargain for more liberal procurement practices
and technical standards have been relatively unsuccessful. 
1 3
V. TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
Three primary forces seem to be at work in promoting a freely
competitive telecommunications market in Japan: Japanese consum-
ers, Japanese private enterprise, and exporting nations (predomi-
nantly the United States). Simply stated, Japanese industry and the
consumer have suffered from the stronghold which NTT has had on
the communications market. Since telecommunicatons equipment
and services were sold only through NTT, who contracted exclusively
with companies within the communications "family," 132 a large por-
tion of the private sector was prevented from competing on a national
level. This lack of competition created higher prices for purchasers of
telecommunications equipment and services.133 Recognizing the van-
guard role telecommunications will play in the structure of a highly
organized, information-oriented society, the Japanese Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications recently set forth "Long Term Goals
of Telecommunications [in the] 21st Century."1 34 The main themes of
this policy are: (1) given prime importance to the peoples' interest,
(2) promoting free competition, and (3) achieving an advanced tele-




132. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-84-2, ASSESSMENT OF BILAT-
ERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN, 2 app. I (Oct. 7, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as GAO ASSESSMENT].
133. For example, the price of telephone installation in a family home prior to NTT's
Privatization was about $400. Telephone interview with Shizu Munekata, Director of Public
Affairs California Office, Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public Corp. (Feb. 8, 1985).
134. Koyama, Social Requirements Lead to New Telecommunication Networks, Bus. JA-
PAN, Apr. 1984, at 45, 47-49.
135. Id Among the steps the Ministry is considering in hope of achieving advanced tele-
communications systems and promoting free competition are the following: (1) constructing a
nationwide Information Network System (INS) utilizing existing metallic cables and new fiber
optic systems; (2) establishing new laws and regulations to: (a) facilitate emergence of new
telecommunications entities; (b) plan long term economic guidelines to deal with the influence
of advanced telecommunications on society; (c) give tax incentives for research and develop-
ment projects; (d) minimize the conditions required for competition in order to encourage
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sory Council sees the expansion of telecommunications and
information technologies into all facts of business and personal activi-
ties as the means to an enhanced and prosperous economic and social
structure.
136
A. Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Procurement Agreement
A positive sign of Japan's willingness to increase the competitive-
ness of its telecommunications market came in December, 1980 with
the signing of the NTT Procurement Agreement. 137 This bilateral
agreement granted mutual reciprocal market opportunities between
the United States and Japan in the telecommunications field.1 38 The
agreement committed NTT to procure its needs based on competitive
bidding without discriminating against United States manufactur-
ers. 139 In addition to offering the United States access to NTT's tele-
communications purchases, the agreement was designed to liberalize
Japan's domestic interconnect market."4
creativity and technological progress; and (e) to create new standards for communication,
safety, and reliability; and (3) connecting networks of existing enterprise with those of new-
comers. Id
136. Id at 45. New developments in Japan's telecommunications research toward what is
deemed the "industrialization of information" is envisioned to pervade all facets of the social
structure. Technological advances are designed to serve "information-oriented industries"
represented by office and factory automation, "information-oriented homes" represented by
home security and home shopping, and "information-oriented society" represented by the
communication system for administrative information. Id
137. Telecommunications Procurement Agreement, Dec. 19, 1980, United States-Japan,
T.I.A.S. No. 9961 [hereinafter cited as NTT Agreement or Agreement]. The Agreement be-
came effective January 1, 1981 for a three year period.
138. The NTT Agreement consisted of an exchange of letters between the Japanese Repre-
sentative for External Economic Relations, Dr. Saburo Okita, and the United States Trade
Representative, Ambassador Reuben O'D. Askew. The Agreement expressed the hope of an
open and competitive procurement policy to "work toward reciprocal and worldwide liberali-
zation of procurement in the field of telecommunications." NTT Agreement, supra note 137,
at 4 (letter of Dr. Saburo Okita, para. 6).
139. The letter from Dr. Okita to Ambassador Askew stated in part: "It is the policy of
the Government of Japan to provide non-discriminatory and competitive opportunities in its
procurement operations and to guide Government-affiliated agencies such as the Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) to do likewise. It is our objective to achieve an open,
transparent, and competitive telecommunications market." NTT Agreement, supra note 137,
at 2 (letter of Dr. Saburo Okita, para. 2). The new NTT procurement procedures were at-
tached to this letter. Id at 5-19 (Attachment I).
140. The interconnect market generally consists of terminal equipment connecting cus-
tomers to a telecommunications system. The market is primarily customer-provided. This
means manufacturers, subject to NIT inspection and approval, can sell directly to Japanese
consumers. NTT's definition of interconnect equipment, however, has traditionally been nar-
rower than the U.S. definition. For example, NTT does not include basic instruments, such as
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The NTT Agreement was entered into as part of the Government
Procurement Code,1 41 which sought to eliminate non-tariff trade bar-
riers encountered by foreign suppliers in government procurement
contracts. The Code was enacted pursuant to discussions at the To-
kyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) 142 conducted
under the auspices of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).1 43 During discussions concerning the scope of the Govern-
ment Procurement Code, a dispute arose between the United States
and Japan as to whether the NTT was an entity included under the
coverage of the Code.'" Japan was reluctant to include NTT.145 Fi-
nally, yielding to the United States' pressure that NTT was the only
the first telephone in a home or office, as part of the interconnect system. GAO ASSESSMENT,
supra note 132, at 14, app. II.
141. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979 T.I.A.S. No. 10403 pream-
ble, para. 1 [hereinafter cited as Procurement Code or Code], reprinted in AGREEMENTS
REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc.
No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 67-189 (1979). The Procurement Code standardized
methods of government procurement of capital goods and is designed to reduce or eliminate
nontariff measures of their trade restricting or distorting effects. The code applies only to
product purchases and excludes the purchase of services of signatory nations. Services inci-
dental to products are regulated by the Code when the service does not exceed the cost of the
product. Procurement Code, pt. I para. l(a). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518. The Government Procurement Code is embodied in §§ 2511-2518 of the
Trade Agreements Act.
142. The Tokyo Rounds sought the removal of NTBs through a system of codes of con-
duct which prescribed new rules and procedures requiring alteration and formalization of gov-
ernment and business behavior. This basis for these talks, which lasted over five years, are
contained in the "Tokyo Declaration," which was set forth to "reduce or eliminate non-tariff
measures or, where this is not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restrictive or
distorting effects, and to bring such measures under more effective international discipline."
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Tokyo Declaration on Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Sept. 14, 1973, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Press Release GAT'/
1134, para. 3(b), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1533 (1973).
143. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947 in a
post-War effort to reduce trade obstacles in order to foster freer trade. The framework for
negotiations was begun by a group of 22 countries in Geneva in 1947 to achieve "substantial
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and to the elimination of preferences, on a recipro-
cal and mutually advantageous basis." The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, con-
cluded October 30, 1947, 61 STAT A3, A7 T.I.A.S. No. 1700 U.N.T.S. 187, 188. GATT
protocol has laid the foundation for international trade, now binding over 85 signatory coun-
tries and accounting for over 80% of international trade. See D. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL
BuSINESS TRANSACTIONS 146-56 (2d ed. 1984).
144. This dispute took place from January to June, 179. See UNrTED STATES-JAPAN
TRADE COUNCIL, COUNCIL REPORT, No. 6, at 3 (Feb. 8, 1980). For a full discussion of this
controversial and acrimonious debate see Note, United States-Japan Trade Developments
Under the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 139, 169-70
n.187 (1981).
145. Id
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governmental entity whose procurements were sufficiently large and
technologically advanced to provide the necessary reciprocity, Japan
consented to the inclusion.146 Believing the Code ignored quality con-
trol, Japan held the position that its need to maintain high quality
prevented it from opening all contracts to competitive bidding. 147 Bi-
lateral negotiations continued on this issue after the Tokyo Rounds.
On December 19, 1980, the U.S. and Japan agreed to bring NTT's
procurement procedures into conformity with the Government Pro-
curement Code.
1 48
To open its procurement market for foreign competition, and
still maintain the quality of its telecommunications system, NTT de-
veloped a five "Track" procurement procedure. This system places
strict management and technical requirements on suppliers. 14 9 Track
I covers nonpublic mainline communications equipment and is sub-
ject to bids by suppliers from all Code signatories. 150 Tracks II and
III are most important to U.S. suppliers because they cover high tech-
nology and high dollar volume public telecommunications equipment,
which U.S. firms sell competitively. 51 Track II lists procedures for
purchases of equipment available in the market, which can be used as
is or modified to meet NTT's requirements. 152 Track III covers tele-
communications equipment unavailable in a suitable form in the mar-
ketplace and which requires development specifically for, or in
cooperation with, NTT. 153 Telecommunications purchases in Track
III accounts for over half of NTT's annual $3 billion procurement
budget.154 Business arrangements under Track III often take the
form of joint ventures between foreign private enterprise and NTT.
146. Hearings on Implementation of the NIT Procurement Agreement Before the House
Subcomm. on Telecommunication Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Comm on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) (Statement of W. Douglas Newkirk).
147. See NIHON KEIZ1A SHIMBUM, INDUSTRIAL REVIEw OF JAPAN, 84-85 (1980).
148. NTT Agreement, supra note 137.
149. Id at 5-17 (Attachment I). These procurement procedures regulate all purchases
other than those excepted by the Government Procurement Code.
150. Id. at 5 (Attachment I, para. 2). Track I covers (1) General Materials such as hard-
ware, paper products, utility vehicles, telephone poles, as well as (2) High Technology Prod-
ucts such as data terminals, private branch exchange (PBX), and facsimile equipment. GAO
ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 5, app. I.
151. Id at 5-6 (Attachment I, para. 2). Covered under Tracks II and III are, inter alia,
switching systems, carrier transmission equipment, radio units, on-line computer, cable and
telephone apparatus, teletex terminals and automobile telephones. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra
note 132, at 5, app. I.
152. Id
153. Id at 6, app. I.
154. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 29, 1980, at 50.
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In addition, NTT can use Track II-A and Track III-A to make fol-
low-up purchases of any product purchased previously under Track
II or III.155
The major drawback to U.S. business is these Tracks involve pro-
cedures and requirements that often take months and sometimes years
to complete in order to win a procurement contract. Under Tracks II
and III, NTT is required to publish a detailed announcement in the
Official Gazette (Kampo) of products it decides to purchase. 15 6 Inter-
ested firms responding on a timely basis receive the procurement doc-
umentation needed to submit an application.157 Track I procedures
require prospective suppliers to undergo an extensive prequalification
process. A supplier must submit an application and several docu-
ments, including a resume, a summary and a company standing de-
scription of manufacturing facilities, financial statements, and
business records. 158 NTT examines these documents, conducts any
needed plant inspections, and obtains required product samples. To
successfully qualify, a supplier must satisfy conditions regarding capi-
talization, creditworthiness, production, and quality. 159 Track II and
III procedures are even more complex and time consuming. Docu-
155. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 6, app. I.
156. For a detailed list of the announcement information required by the Code to be pub-
lished in the Kampo, see NIT Agreement, supra note 137, at 6-8 (Attachment I, para. 4)
reprinted in Note, International Trade: Government Procurement of Telecommunications
Equipment, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 464, 466 n.14 (1981). Essentially, the system operates as
follows: Announcements of NTT's proposed purchases, as well as qualification procedures,
are cabled to the Foreign Commercial Service to Washington, D.C. and disbursed via com-
puter to United States firms. Announcements or Summary Announcements are simultane-
ously published in the Department of Commerce's Commerce Business Daily containing key
information such as: (1) the subject matter of the procurement; (2) the time limit for submis-
sion of applications; and (3) the addresses where necessary documents and further information
can be requested.
157. The Agreement sets forth detailed procedures for procurement announcements and
for obtaining the procurement documentation needed to submit a bid application. What is not
included in the Agreement, however, are any guidelines for the terms or conditions of informa-
tion requested in the procurement documentation. The Agreement does not, in the interests of
reducing overly complex or cumbersome requirements for final qualification, place any limita-
tions on the economic and technical requirements, financial guarantees, or other information
requested from suppliers. NTT Agreement, supra note 137, at 5-17 (Attachment I). But it
does state that "NTT, in the process of qualifying/selecting suppliers, shall give equal treat-
ment to all applicants whether foreign or domestic." Id at 12 (Attachment I, para. 12).
158. See NIPPON TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH PUBLIC CORPORATION SPECIAL REGULA-
TIONS FOR HANDLING GOODS PURCHASE CONTRACTS art. I (English Translation).
159. Id Track I procedures for U.S. suppliers are as follows: (1) a pre-qualification notice
appears in Kampo; (2) a translated copy is sent to the United States for dissemination; (3) U.S.
firms request pre-qualification documents from NTT; (4) NTT inspects the U.S. firm's creden-
tials; (5) NTT sends notice of pre-qualification results; (6) NIT issues tender to the U.S. firms
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mentation submitted on these tracks is scrutinized at all levels of the
NTT decision making-process. 16° Further, NTT conducts rigid in-
spection of sample products for conformity with electrical, noise level,
and durability standards and analyzes internal working parts.1 61
Although the NTT Agreement is designed to provide nondis-
criminatory access to procurement opportunities, much discretion is
left with NTT to favor domestic suppliers. For instance, the Code
permits limitations on the number of suppliers if consistent with the
efficient operation of the system, and allows NTT to conduct a
"closed" selection process in Tracks II and 111.162 The continued
favoring of domestic industry is most problematic in Track III where
joint research and development projects often create new technolo-
gies. In the interests of giving its own industry the competitive edge
in new technologies, it is understandable why NTT would be com-
pelled to award these contracts to Japanese firms. As a consequence,
many more United States firms are establishing branch offices in Ja-
pan to facilitate the close cooperation needed in such joint projects.
The Interconnect Market Understanding,1 63 which evolved from
negotiations leading to the NTT Procurement Agreement, opened the
door for the United States to compete in Japan's interconnect mar-
ket.164 The interconnect market is the segment of the domestic public
telecommunications equipment market which is both NTT and cus-
tomer provided.1 65 It generally consists of terminal equipment con-
which have successfully pre-qualified; (7) U.S. firms submit bids; and (8) NTT awards the final
contract. See Note, supra note 144, at 172 n.201.
160. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 6, app. I.
161. Id
162. Note, supra note 144, at 176.
163. NTT Agreement, supra note 137, at 24-27 (Joint Statement, dated Dec. 19, 1980,
concerning reciprocal liberalization of the interconnect market).
164. Although this Understanding is appended to the NTT Agreement documents, it was
concluded separately from the NTT Agreement and, unlike the latter, has no termination date.
Aggregate sales in the interconnect market approximate $1 billion annually and constitute
35% of potential telecommunications sales to Japan. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at
14 app. Il.
165. Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Public Corp., Japan's Interconnect Market and
NTT's Procurement Market 2 (1984) (available from NiT's Los Altos office) [hereinafter cited
as Interconnect Document]. Most equipment is permitted to be customer-provided with the
exception of primary telephones and coin operated telephones which are provided exclusively
by NTT. See supra note 140. "In Japan, customers may purchase interconnect equipment
directly from suppliers and connect it to the telecommunications network." However, NTT's
approval for compliance with technical requirements is necessary in order to connect private
leased-line equipment into Japan's telecommunications system. Two types of approval are
used: Product-type approval and Individual document approval. The former involves inspec-
tion of certain types of equipment, and the latter is approval of a customer's connection of
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necting customers to a telecommunications system. 166 Specifically, it
is composed of telephones and telephone systems, facsimile equip-
ment, PBXs,167 and data terminal equipment.168 The Understanding
established a mechanism through which United States and other for-
eign firms can obtain NTT approval to sell products on Japan's inter-
connect market. To accomplish this, NTT revised its rules and
regulations. It agreed to accept test data from foreign firms and labo-
ratories to fulfill type-approval requirements and to inspect the cus-
tomer's installations of equipment within two weeks of the inspection
request. 169 The procedure for interconnection of customer-provided
equipment is briefly as follows: First, a manufacturer must submit an
Application for Type Approval Inspection to NTT. NTT then con-
ducts a Type Approval Inspection and, if satisfied with the product,
designates Type Approval. The manufacturer is then free to sell to
the customer, who will interconnect the equipment to a domestic
communications network. Installation must also be inspected and ap-
proved by NTT. 170
The Interconnect Understanding appears to be fulfilling its in-
tended objective. Between January 1981 and April 1983, NTT ap-
proved all requests to sell or install United States-made interconnect
equipment in Japan, involving 147 different type products from 40
particular equipment to a domestic telecommunications network. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra
note 132, at 14 app. II. Denial of Individual document approval was the center of the Control
Data and Tymshare controversies in the 1970's. These problems were alleviated when MPT
authorized a deregulation for its international leased line carrier, KDD, thereby allowing the
use of multiple processing centers overseas. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
166. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 14 app. II.
167. PBX is an acronym for Private Automatic Branch Exchange. It is "a private auto-
matic telephone exchange that provides for the transmission of calls to and from the public
telephone network. Some PBX's now contain microprocessors which make possible such serv-
ices as direct-access inward dialing, automatic least-cost routing, speed calling, conference call-
ing, and automatic ringing." SELECTED ISSUES REPORT, supra note 3, at 51.
168. Interconnect Document, supra note 165, at 6.
169. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 15 app. II. In the Interconnect Market Un-
derstanding Japan agreed: (1) NTT would make type-approval available for all classes of cus-
tomer-provided equipment; (2) NTT would continue to publish all relevant documents and
other information or requirements for having products accepted for type approval; (3) NTT
would accept test data in any area from domestic and foreign firms in a non-discriminatory
manner; (4) NTT would grant or deny approval expeditiously (normally within two months);
(5) NTT would complete installation inspections within approximately two weeks of the in-
spection request; (6) NTT would hold a series of seminars to acquaint firms wishing to sell
customer-provided equipment to the Japanese market; and (7) NTT would publish appropriate
documents in English to facilitate sales by foreign manufacturers. NTT Agreement, supra note
137, at 24-27 (Joint Statement).
170. Interconnect Document, supra note 165, at 34.
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United States firms.171 Of these, five firms had been granted type-
approval to sell eleven types of equipment including headsets, tele-
phone sets, PBX equipment, and acoustic couplers.17 2 Plantronics,
Inc., after ten years of fruitless contact with Japanese officials from
NTT, MITI and JETRO (Japanese External Trade Organization),
suddenly received approval in March 1981 (three months after the
Agreement took effect) to sell its telephone headsets to private indus-
try in Japan. 173 Nevertheless, critics still contend that NTT's ap-
proval procedures are too cumbersome and costly. For example, one
company spent about seven months and $550,000 to obtain NTT
type-approval for its PBX equipment.'74 It was required to modify
the equipment to meet NTT's technical requirements and translate all
technical manuals into Japanese. The consensus among American
suppliers appears to be that NTT is acting in good faith and in ac-
cordance with the terms of the Agreement.17 5 The Commerce De-
partment notes, however, that the Japanese still rely on a number of
non-tariff barriers associated with the interconnect market in areas
not covered by the Agreement. 76
1. Impact of the NTT Agreement
The Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Procurement Agreement
was renewed for another three year period on January 30, 1984. The
renewal decision was a difficult one, primarily because sales to NTT
were lower than anticipated during the initial three year term. 77
Sales "to NTT in 1981 and 1982 amounted to only about $15.2 mil-
lion and $40 million respectively and were comprised of relatively low
technology products. 1' ' 78 In 1983, sales increased threefold to ap-
proximately $142 million; still not considered significant in relation to
171. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 15 app. II.
172. Id
173. High Tech Gateway, supra note 60, at 42.
174. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 15 app. II.
175. Id.
176. Id at 16; L.A. Times, supra note 127.
177. While the NTT Agreement did not guarantee U.S. firms sales, it did guarantee sales
opportuitites. The success of the Agreement was measured by three sales performance fac-
tors: (1) significant sales in terms of value and volume; (2) sales of sophisticated telecommuni-
cations equipment; and (3) sales of product types leading to long term business relationships
with U.S. firms. Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Procurement Agreement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (Mar. 7, 1984) (Statement of Ambassador
William E. Brock, United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter cited as Brock Statement].
178. Id U.S. sales to NTT included some high technology items such as echo cancelers
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the $3 billion Japanese telecommunications market.1 79 The results
were also disappointing because most of the sales continued to be low
technology areas, not in the large switching equipment area that
would indicate a long-term relationship.18 0
Three primary factors are responsible for sales not meeting U.S.
Government expectations: (1) Insufficient time had passed to see
meaningful results; (2) NTT experienced major start-up problems in
implementing the agreement; and (3) United States firms were reluc-
tant to take advantage of the NTT Agreement.18 1 Regarding the last
factor, American firms must incur the high costs of maintaining in-
country presence, translating documents, and often modifying its
products to make sales to NTT. 182 The consensus among United
States businesses seemed to be that NTT's purchasing specifications
were too rigid, bid deadlines were too short, and purchases were in
lots too small to be commercially attractive.18 3 Efforts to remedy
these problems were taken by NTT in 1983 subsequent to a meeting
between the United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Wil-
liam E. Brock, and the President of NTT, Dr. Hisashi Shinto.184 Af-
and PBX's, but nearly half of the sales were in low technology products like magnetic tape.
GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 4 app. I.
179. Brock Statement, supra note 177, at 3; GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 42.
180. Brock Statement, supra note 177, at 3.
181. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 4 app. I. U.S. industry officials predicted it
would take at least three years to see significant levels of major sales to NTT. Suppliers needed
time to study the new telecommunications system and learn how to deal with the new cus-
tomer (then a government agency), and NTT needed time to assess the dependibility of the
suppliers and their products. Initially, NIT was divided in its support of the agreement. NTT
officials acknowledged significant difficulties in implementing the Agreement's procurement
procedures, and continued using generally discriminatory pre-Agreement procedures for prod-
ucts not having specifications. Of equal importance was the reluctance on the part of U.S.
telecommunications firms, particularly smaller and medium-sized firms, to invest in the Japa-
nese market. Many were waiting for large multinational corporations to penetrate the market
before making substantial investments. Id. at 4-9 app. I.
182. One American supplier representative stated his company incurred costs of about
$400,000 a year to maintain a one-person office in Japan. Another firm estimated costs of
$100,000 merely to translate its product proposal into Japanese. Participation in Track III
procurement can require especially high investment (e.g. $10 million), yet there is no guarantee
that the supplier will realize a sale. A firm selected to develop a product under Track III is
given no assurance that NTT will purchase the resulting equipment in sufficient quantity or
price for the firm to realize a profit. Numerous U.S. business representatives have reported
their companies investing up to three years and substantial financial resources to sell equip-
ment to NiT and made little if any profit. Id at 9-10 app. I. For specific instance of proposal
and development costs see, NYT.Agreement Hearings, supra note 177, at 53-57 (Statement of
Charles Lecht, Chairman of Lecht Sciences Inc.).
183. Brock Statement, supra note 177, at 7-8.
184. Id at 8. As added incentive to U.S. firms, NTT began to accept bids in English at
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ter this point, NTT cooperation and commitment to the Agreement
seemed to increase and U.S. firms indicated a growing optimism
about prospects for future sales.
The U.S. Trade Representative deemed the renewal agreement
an "unqualified success."185 Based on advice from U.S. firms on im-
provements in the process, the renewal agreement incorporated all the
modifications sought by the United States. 186 Continuation of the
Agreement is important for a number of reasons. First, Japan's tele-
communications market is the second largest in the world, and NTT
procurement represents about forty percent of Japan's telecommuni-
cations market. Second, the Agreement offers a valuable opportunity
for United States business to participate in Japan's telecommunica-
tions system by providing a previously nonexistent formal procure-
ment process and equal market access, bringing the United States
closer to its goals of freer trade and open telecommunications mar-
kets. Third, exposure to the development of Japan's high technology
industries and standards for quality is beneficial for American firms in
order for them to remain on the cutting edge of innovation. 187 NTT
research in optical telecommunications, semiconductors, and com-
puter science is at the very forefront of technology. 188 Without access
to a source that will be shaping the future in world telecommunica-
tions equipment and services, United States companies are at a great
disadvantage. 189 Additionally, it is vital to the U.S. economy to re-
their new New York office rather than only in Tokyo. Subsequent to renewal of the Agree-
ment, and as further evidence of their commitment, NTT established a second U.S. office in
Los Altos, California. This office, located in the Silicon Valley, is designed to support NTT
procurement operations with high technology and software firms in the Western United States.
These operations include accepting applications for procurement and consulting with those
firms interested in selling to NTT. See, NTT Information Desk, Background Information on
New California NTT Office (Available from NTT's Los Altos office).
185. Brock Statement, supra note 177, at 11.
186. The modifications sought and obtained were:
(1) Access for U.S. firms to NTT's research and development activities on the same basis
as Japanese firms;
(2) A commitment to use Internationally accepted standard contract terms;
(3) A commitment to protect proprietary information;
(4) Agreement to set purchase specifications so as to maximize opportunities for competi-
tion; and
(5) A commitment not to require joint development projects when U.S. firms can meet
NTT need with products that are already available.
Brock Statement, supra note 177, at 10.
187. NTT Agreement Hearings, supra note 177, at 27-28 (Statement of Lionel Olmer).
188. Id
189. Id at 28. For an interesting perspective on Japan's superiority in telecommunication
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duce its huge trade deficit. Part of the solution to this problem lies in
increasing exports of U.S. high technology products and services.
2. Implementation of the NTT Agreement
The key to success of the renewed Agreement will be in the com-
petence, initiative, and persistence of American companies. The
United States Government also has a vital role to play in assisting
American business by monitoring the progression of access to the Jap-
anese market and by maintaining open lines of communication with
NTT (i.e., expert level exchanges) necessary to developing long term
commitments. The International Trade Administration (ITA) of the
Department of Commerce is responsible for implementing the Agree-
ment and acts as a liason between NTT and United States industry. 190
Expert level exchanges have resulted in several important agree-
ments. One such agreement is between the National Bureau of Stan-
dards and NTT.' 91 It provides for a one year period of mutual
orientation of the staffs from two laboratories through an exchange of
reports and on-site visits. 92  Along the same lines, Commerce's
NTIA, in conjunction with the FCC, agreed to a series of expert-level
meetings with Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the
ministry responsible for formulating Japan's international telecommu-
nications policies. 193 Such reciprocal actions indicate Japanese will-
ingness to share in an economic partnership with the United States in
the interests of gaining greater technological advantage. 94
B. The Telecommunications Business Law and
the NTT Company Bill
Japan's Diet, 95 in December 1984, passed two bills which the
innovation see Lecht, The Chysanthemum or the Sword, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 5, 1984, at
49, 52 reprinted in NTT Agreement Hearings, supra note 177, at 70-71.
190. Olmer Statement, supra note 187, at 31. The ITA assists in disseminating prequalifi-
cation announcements, distributes information kits on how to do business in Japan, handles
telephone inquiries and written requests for help, and provides personal briefings and seminars
for U.S. companies. In 1983, for example, American Express Co. was told by NTT that it
would be required to change all of its telephone numbers in Japan if it bought a Rolm Corp.
digital PBX. Through ITA's intervention NTT was persuaded to change the regulations,
thereby allowing American Express to go through with its purchase without having to bear the
additional expense of changing its numbers. Id. at 31-32.
191. Id at 38.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 38-39.
194. Accord supra note I and accompanying quote.
195. The Diet is Japan's legislative body which consists of two Houses.
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United States business community and government hoped would dis-
mantle the remaining vestiges of protective Japanese telecommunica-
tions policy: The NTT Company Bill196 and the Telecommunications
Business Law.' 97 These bills, effective April 1, 1985, are purportedly
designed to introduce competition into the Japanese telecommunica-
tions market. However, many U.S. officials and critics believe the leg-
islation represents a "major step backwards" in trade relations with
Japan. 1
98
1. The NTT Company Bill
The NTT Company Bill transforms NTT from a public company
to a privately-owned corporation. The move to privatize NTT is
designed to accelerate Japan's emergence as an information society by
introducing competition into its domestic market. 99 MITI has en-
couraged the privatization, realizing that NTT's monopoly status
hampers innovation by reducing competitive market forces .2 ° How-
ever, both the Diet and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions share scepticism as to the telecommunications giant's ability to
survive the initial stages of transition. Accordingly, the government
has been given up to five years in which to sell up to half of the NTT
stock it controls.20' To remedy the inefficiency of NTT's cumbersome
size, the immediate goal is to streamline NTT into markets concen-
trated on long-distance and higher-technology.2°2 At first, NTT will
not be broken up into regional companies.2 03 Eventually, "the elec-
tronic communications service business itself will be liberalized as
well as the full usage of communications channels. ' ' 2° This should
lead to abolition of the types of restrictions encountered by Control
Data and Tymshare in the 1970's.205 At the same time, the installa-
tion of standard telephone sets will also be opened to the public.
196. Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Company -Bill, Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushiki
Kaisha Law, (1984) [hereinafter cited as NT Company Bill].
197. Telecommunications Business Law (Unofficial Translation), I Japanese Legislation of
Telecommunications (1984) [hereinafter cited as Telecomm. Bus. Law].
198. Rovit, Special Report: Cellular Equipment Market Controversy, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS, Jan. 1985 at 32.
199. Phalon, Letting go, FORBES, Mar. 11, 1985, at 38.
200. PTC Conf. Paper, supra note 118, at 112.
201. Letting go, supra note 199, at 40.
202. PTC Conf. Paper, supra note 118, at 112.
203. Id.
204. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Your Market in Japan: Communica-
tions Equipment, 4 Mini Report 3 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter cited as JETRO Report 4].
205. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:95
Japanese Telecommunications
From April 1985 onward, subscribers will be able to purchase any
telephone set freely. 2°6 Under previous regulations, the standard tele-
phone set had to be one designated by NTT.20 7 For Japanese busi-
ness, the result will be more sophisticated and lower cost systems for
sending and receiving computer data. 20 8 For U.S. companies, the
change could mean unprecedented entry into Japan's $3 billion tele-
communications market.
2°9
Initially, NTT stock will continue to be held entirely by the gov-
ernment, then up to 49% will be sold to the public. 210 The NTT
Company Bill requires the government to retain one-third owner-
ship.211 It also precludes foreigners or foreign companies from ac-
quiring NTT shares, but companies with less than 50% foreign
interest will be eligible for shareholding. 2 2 Although "privatized,"
NTT's business endeavors will remain in the control of the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications. Article 11 of the Company Bill
provides that NTT shall formulate a yearly business plan which must
receive authorization from the Minister of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions before commencement of the business year.213 Article 15 pro-
vides that the Minister may, when necessary, issue to the Company
orders necessary for "the supervision relating to its business
activities."2 1
4
One complaint from the United States Congress is that the Japa-
nese largely ignored the procedures of the Standards Code in the pro-
cess of privatizing NTT. 215 The Standards Code gives the United
States an opportunity to comment formally on the standards drafting
process. Although Japan promised to provide a nine week period for
U.S. comment on the new standards, testing, labeling and certification
requirements, the regulations were made available to U.S. firms only
16 days before they became final. 216 Related to this, is the continuing
Japanese practice of drafting standards and technical regulations on
206. JETRO Report 4, supra note 204, at 3.
207. Id.
208. A New Path Onto NTT's Turf for US. Giants, Bus. WK., Mar. 5, 1984, at 43.
209. Id.
210. PTC Conf. Paper, supra note 118, at 112.
211. Letting go, supra note 199, at 40.
212. Id.
213. NTT Company Bill, supra note 196, at 3, art. 11.
214. Id. at 4, art. 15.
215. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO UN-
FAIR TRADE PRACTICES OF JAPAN, S. REP. No. 102, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985).
216. Id.
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the advice of Japanese industries interested in excluding foreign com-
petition for their own economic benefit. 217 Another concern is
whether the policy goals of NTT Procurement Agreement will be im-
plemented by the MPT once NTT is broken into smaller, non-govern-
mental units.
2. The Telecommunications Business Law
The Telecommunications Business Law is designed to protect the
interests of users and promote the welfare and convenience of the
public. 218 It seeks to accomplish this by ensuring the sound develop-
ment of telecommunications, the reasonable operation of the telecom-
munications business, and by securing consistent provision of
telecommunication service. 219 This goal is to be achieved by increased
levels of competition. The legislation permits foreign "private compa-
nies to set up and operate value added networks (VANs) using public
[tele]phone lines."' 220 It also "authorize[s] large, nationwide networks
to which individual consumers can buy access. ' 221 However, the
MPT retains control of screening applications for VAN operations,
which could preclude the entry of foreign competitors, depending on
how the Ministry chooses to exercise its power.222 The Business Law
provides for "Fairness in Use; ' 223 that is, a "telecommunications car-
rier shall not discriminate unfairly in providing telecommunications
service. '2
24
The new legislation extends beyond the scope of both the NTT
Agreement and the Government Procurement Code in that it estab-
lishes extensive guidelines for foreign competition to "set up" tele-
communications businesses in Japan. 225 To accomplish this, the Bill
categorizes the telecommunications business into Type I and Type
217. Id
218. Telecom. Bus. Law, supra note 197, at 1, art. 1.
219. Id Article 1 states:
The purpose of this Law is, considering the public nature of telecommunications
business, by ensuring the proper and reasonable operation of such business, to secure
the consistent provision of telecommunications service, to protect the interests of its
users, and thereby to ensure both the sound development of telecommunications and
the convenience of the people, and to promote the welfare of the public.
220. A New Path Onto NTT's Turf, supra note 208, at 45.
221. Id Under the former system NTT only allowed small private companies to build
networks for their own use.
222. PTC Conf. Paper, supra note 118, at 113.
223. Telecom. Bus. Law, supra note 197, at 3, art. 7.
224. Id
225. Id at 4-16, arts. 9-28.
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11,226 and sets forth the detailed requirements for obtaining permis-
sion to operate a telecommunications business.227 Any persons or
business who intends to operate a Type I telecommunications business
must obtain permission by filing an application with the Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications. 22 Permission will be granted only if
an application for permission conforms to each of the following
categories:
i) Telecommunications service to be provided [is]... appropriate
in light of the demand in the service territory.
ii) The introduction of the telecommunications business [does]
not result in a significant excess of telecommunications circuit fa-
cilities... in any part of the territory....
iii) The applicant [has] an adequate financial basis and technical
capability....
iv) The plan of the telecommunications business [is] reliable and
feasible.
v) [T]he introduction of the telecommunications business [is] ap-
propriate for the sound development of telecommunications in
general.2
29
With enactment of the new law, some sources estimate that the
annual growth rate for services to computer and telecommunications
users will boost up to thirty percent from the ten to twenty percent
present level.230 While there are concerns in Japan that United States
experience in running networks could result in monopolization of the
market, the new law limits foreign ownership/participation in VANs
to thirty percent.231 This reduces the threat of America's technologi-
cal superiority. Other limitations, such as the denial of VAN licenses,
would likely be placed on foreign competition if perceived as ad-
versely affecting the welfare of the Japanese people.232 Fear of these
226. ML at 3, art. 6. Article 6 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Type I telecommunications business shall be that business which provides tele-
communications service by establishing telecommunications circuit facilities (which
mean transmission line facilities connecting transmission points with receiving
points, switching facilities installed as inseparable units therefrom, and other facili-
ties accessory to such facilities .... ).
(3) Type II telecommunications business shall be any other telecommunications
business than Type I telecommunications business.
227. Id at 4-16, arts. 9-28.
228. Id at 4, art. 9.
229. Id at 4-5, art. 10.
230. A New Path Onto NTT's Turf, supra note 208, at 45.
231. Id
232. Id (Taken from statement of Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone to Diet committee in
February 1984).
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limitations does not, however, appear to be stopping the plans of large
U.S. corporations. AT&T and IBM Corp. are two firms laying the
foundation for major involvement in the Japanese telecommunica-
tions market.
233
While the Japanese are touting the Telecommunications Business
Law as a trade liberalization measure, some view it as a continuation
of Japan's protectionist policies. 234 The Law's "Disqualification for
Permission" provision (Article 11), applicable to Type I business,
seems to indicate the latter.235 It states that permission to operate
Type I telecommunications business will not be granted to:
iv) Any person who does not have Japanese nationality.
v) Any foreign government or its representative.
vi) Any foreign juridical person or association.
236
This language is a strong indication that the Japanese govern-
ment wants to restrict wholly or predominantly foreign entities from
entering the Japanese market. These disqualifications do not, how-
ever, apply to Type II businesses.237 In addition to limiting the na-
tionality of those individuals who may be certified for approval, the
legislation creates a new, independent testing body which is domi-
nated by Japanese industry. This restricts the ability of U.S. industry
to "influence the critical rewriting of equipment standards as they are
reissued as official [MPT] . . . standards. '23  Other concerns of
United States officials are that the Law requires unnecessary applica-
tion information, "including confidential business data, and obli-
gate[s] United States businesses to obtain prior approval at various
233. AT&T International is planning to establish a joint venture with twenty end-user
companies in Japan to develop a nationwide value-added network by using AT&T's AIS/Net
100 operating system. The venture will be built around supercenters in which large scale
computer, bulk storage sub-systems, and electronic multipurpose digital exchanges will store,
convert, and transmit information to various users through one of the supercenters. Some of
the companies AT&T is said to have approached are Asahi Shimbum (a leading newspaper
publisher), Dentsu Advertising, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Itoh Yokado (a supermarket
chain), Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Trading Co., and Sony. Meanwhile, IBM Japan has formed two
joint ventures with Mitsubishi Corp. and Cosmo 80: AST and AST SOKEN. This group also
plans to supply large scale VANs. Both companies are reportedly working closely with NTT
in providing software to connect their network systems to those of NTT, as well as leasing
communications lines from NTT. Kurita, Two US. giants scramble for market share, ELEC.
Bus., June 15, 1984, at 60. GTE and General Electric Corp. have similar joint venture plans
but on a less grandiose scale. New Path Onto N77s Turf, supra note 208, at 45.
234. See Special Report, supra note 198, at 31-32.
235. Telecomm. Bus. Law, supra note 197, at 5, art. 11.
236. Id. at 5, art. 1 l(iv)-(vi).
237. Id. at 13-14, art. 26.
238. Special Report, supra note 198, at 32.
Japanese Telecommunications
levels of the Japanese government. '239 It is also argued that the legis-
lation leaves NTT with control over approving digital equipment, and
lacks the safeguards to prevent NTT from using its revenue to cross-
subsidize service where it faces competition. 24°
Analysis of the various provisions of the Telecommunications
Business Law is of questionable value. The real answers lie in how
Japan's Ministries, namely the MPT, are going to implement the leg-
islation to restrict or expand trade. Although it is early to draw well-
founded conclusions, the general sentiment in Congress and among
United States trade negotiators is that Japan remains committed to
keeping its market protected from foreign competition. This senti-
ment has erupted into angry Congressional reaction to restrictive
trade policies, some of which focus particularly on Japan.
C. Congressional Reaction
The Telecommunications Trade Act of 1985,241 authored by Sen-
ator John C. Danforth, is intended to promote international telecom-
munications trade and foster the economic and technological growth
of the United States telecommunications industry.242 The Act seeks
to reduce the trade deficit by (1) ensuring that countries abide by their
commitments to open telecommunications trade;243 and (2) opening
world trading in telecommunications products and services through
negotiation and achievement of equivalent competitive opportunities
for United States telecommunications exporters.2 4 The bill requires
the United States Trade Representative to investigate and report on
trade practices of foreign countries whose policies deny U.S. firms
"competitive opportunities" equivalent to those available in the U.S.
239. L.A. Times, supra note 127, at 1, col. 1 (Statements of Lionel H. Olmer). According
to Mr. Olmer, under the new telecommunications policy U.S. suppliers will still face: (1) a
complex and discriminatory system for registering enhanced services; (2) layer upon layer of
approving authorities (to approve equipment for network attachment), ministerial ordinances,
guidelines, and directives; (3) technical standards not articulated in a clear and nondiscrimina-
tory manner; (4) requests for confidential information before initial approval is granted; (5) a
Telecommunications Advisory Council composed of members from Japanese industry without
any foreign representatives. Schwartz, Hits Japan's New Telecom Policy as Biased, ELEC.
NEWS, Mar. 18, 1985, at 58.
240. Schwartz, supra note 239, at 58.
241. S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). As of the writing of this Comment, the Telecom-
munications Trade Act received unanimous approval by the Senate Finance Committee.
242. Id at § 2(b)(1).
243. Id at § 2(b)(2).
244. Id at § 2(b)(3).
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market within six months of enactment. 245 The bill specifies the Pres-
ident must then take action to remedy or offset such policies.246 If,
after two years, a satisfactory accord has not been attained, the Presi-
dent must enact "retaliatory" measures against the particular
nation.247
Another proposed bill advocates immediate retaliation against
the Japanese by closing the U.S. market to all Japanese telecommuni-
cations equipment until the USTR can certify that U.S. products have
equal access to the Japanese markets.248 Still others would impose a
20% across-the-board surcharge on all imports from Japan for three
years.249 Critics of the Danforth bill believe that the primary cause of
the trade deficit is the high value of the U.S. dollar, which decreases
our competitiveness in international markets.250 Irresponsible bor-
rowing and spending by the U.S. government has pushed up interest
rates, drawn worldwide investment capital and, consequently, forced
up exchange rates. They argue that the Danforth bill, in seeking to
remedy the trade imbalance through opening access to foreign tele-
communications markets, misses the mark.2 51 The real issue here, it
is argued, is the lack of access to Japanese telecommunications mar-
kets, not the imbalance of trade which is primarily due to automobile
and electronics purchases from Japan. Therefore, the issue of access
should be addressed with measures that are most likely to stimulate
opening of the Japanese markets, and the deficit problem addressed
through a fundamental change in fiscal policy.25
2
245. Id. at § 101(a).
246. Id at § 102(a)(1). The President would be required to enter into negotiations to pur-
sue the objectives of: (1) national treatment for U.S. products and services; (2) most favored
nation treatment; (3) non-discriminatory government procurement policies; (4) reasonable
equipment certification standards and procedures; and (5) elimination of non-tariff trade barr-
ers. Id at § 102(a)(2)(B). See also, Lipman & Kiddoo, Int'l trade deficit, telecom markets and
an angry Congress make a volatile mix, TELEPHONY, June 10, 1985, at 38, 39.
247. Such retaliatory actions would include: (1) prohibiting U.S. government procure-
ment of the foreign countries telecommunications goods; (2) imposing requirements for FCC
registration or approval of foreign telecommunications equipment; (3) increasing customs du-
ties; (4) terminating, withdrawing or suspending trade/tariff agreements; (5) implementing a
"buy-America" policy. See supra note 241, at § 102(b).
248. S. 728, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
249. S. 770, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
250. REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND, supra note 215, at 13-14 (Views of Sena-






The movement of Japan's telecommunications policy is, un-
doubtedly, toward market liberalization. Many of the trade impedi-
ments of the 1970's have been abolished. Japan's procurement of
United States telecommunications goods has increased, and larger
numbers of joint ventures between United States and Japanese busi-
nesses are assisting both countries in maintaining their lead as infor-
mation-oriented societies. But the movement away from
protectionism is slow; indeed too slow for United States officials at-
tempting to break down the trade barriers. The cause of the problem
is really twofold. One, Japan has historically been reluctant to import
anything other than basic requirements. A substantial majority of its
imports are in vital resources such as food, oil, and raw materials.
Not having the good fortune of a fertile, resource-laden land, a sense
of economic vulnerability understandably lies at the root of Japan's
stubbornly restrictive economic policies. Two, the United States Gov-
ernment has exacerbated its trade problems by rampant borrowing
and spending, resulting in an overvalued dollar and a serious erosion
of competitiveness in world markets.
National sovereignty is dependant upon economic strength. The
ability to store, process, and transmit information is increasingly be-
coming a source of worldwide economic power. Thus, the United
States and Japan have a critical mutual interest in maintaining their
leadership as the world's two most technologically advanced nations.
Japan refuses, however, to risk a potential loss of independence by
endangering the strength of an industry as vital to the country's fu-
ture economic welfare as telecommunications. Unfortunately, this
posture is in diametric opposition to Japan's articulated policy of re-
ciprocal and worldwide liberalization of trade. Ideally, freer trade
would enable both countries to work together, utilizing each other's
knowledge, toward a goal of more rapid technological advancement.
Trade barriers impede this advancement. Foreign firms have a natu-
ral market in Japan. Without access, the economic stimulus of mu-
tual requirement vanishes. For now, however, the Japanese feel that
the long run interests of their country are served by protecting their
information industries from unfettered foreign competition. Deeply
ingrained cultural values are not simply cast aside in the name of en-
hanced economic relations. Although Japan's Prime Minister favors
freer trade, he must work within the constraints of a system which
delegates much decision-making power to the appropriate ministries.
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The decisions of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications have,
overwhelmingly, been protectionist-minded.
While the telecommunications and computer industries have de-
veloped at a break-neck pace in the last twenty-five years, we are still
at the dawn of a new era. The Information Age is one whose ultimate
potentials are hardly foreseeable today. Thus, it may be wise for the
Japanese to proceed with caution when considering the future pros-
perity of their nation. However, the danger inherent in Japan's trade
position lies in the perception that a huge export surplus is a sign of
strength. This high dependence on the export market leaves Japan
vulnerable to retaliatory protectionist measures. Domestically, pres-
sure continues to rise for Congress to take stiff retaliatory action un-
less Japan adopts quick and effective measures designed to trim its
massive annual trade surplus with the United States.
The issue of telecommunications trade with Japan is much
broader than it appears at first blush. Remedies transcend the trade
relationship between the two countries, and are closely interrelated
with the problems of the United States' budgetary and global trade
deficits. The United States may have no choice but to regulate Ja-
pan's access to the United States market. Import surcharges or recip-
rocal access regulations could speed the Japanese trend toward
liberalization. But retaliatory measures which may assist U.S. busi-
ness in gaining access to the Japanese telecommunications market do
not effectively address the more significant issue of the trade imbal-
ance. A solution to this larger problem lies in devices which make
American exports more competitive in the world outside Japan. Price
reductions can be accomplished through a limitation on United States
spending, domestically and abroad. The implementation of a fiscal
policy designed to dramatically reduce the federal deficit, by cutting
government spending, is a better solution than mere retaliation
against those profiting from our macroeconomic policies. 25 3
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